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Abstract
Employment rates among senior workers (aged 55 or over) in southern Europe are
among the lowest in OECD economies. Spain is a paradigmatic example, with high
unemployment rates and very low workforce reentry rates for unemployed workers.
Poor demand is typically blamed for this problem, but the interaction of pension rules
and unemployment insurance may also play an important role in this outcome.
Generous unemployment benefits, lax search requirements for the unemployed and
strong early retirement penalties imposed on “regular” retirees effectively create an
alternative path to early retirement.
In this paper, we explore this alternative path quantitatively. We develop a model of job
search and retirement behavior, calibrate it to the specificities of the Spanish case and
verify its empirical validity in a large administrative dataset of employment histories. We
then explore the effectiveness of pension reform in increasing the labor supply and
overall welfare. We link early retirement penalties to the age at which an individual
stops paying contributions. This reform removes the incentives to remain unemployed
without searching and thus encourages individuals to either retire or actively engage in
job seeking. The reform also leads to significant welfare losses, especially among the
previously non-participating unemployed who are close to the early retirement age;
however, the reform also raises sufficient additional resources that public authorities
can use to compensate all affected workers.
JEL codes: J64; J68; J26
Keywords: Unemployment; Retirement; Pension reform; Search models
1 Introduction
The Spanish labor market has a longstanding tradition of not being particularly friendly
to elderly workers. At the time of this writing, the employment rates of workers aged
50 to 64 are among the lowest in OECD countries (52% in Spain vs. 62% in the
EU-15). Rates have been low for a long period of time, even after the sharp improvement
in employment recorded in the last cyclical expansion of 2000-2008 (the employment
rate for those aged 50-59 rose from 52% in Q1-2000 to 63% in Q2-2008). This tendency
was abruptly halted during the Great Recession and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis,
which has sent the unemployment rate for this age range skyrocketing to more than 21%
(from 5.3% in Q3-2007). For older workers, unemployment is supposed to be a transitory
stage in the process of returning to the labor force or before a permanent withdrawal from
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the job market. However, the incidence of long-term unemployment (+1 year) is particu-
larly high in this group (46.5% vs. 37.8% in the 16-39 age group), nearly always ending in
total withdrawal from the labor force. Indeed, the observed reentry rates are remarkably
low (in Spain, the quarterly reemployment hazard is less than 13% in the 55-59 age range
and a meager 1.5% in the 60-65 range). To complete the overall picture, note that a small
proportion of the unemployed declare that they are actively searching for a new position.1
Several factors have been invoked to explain this state of affairs. On the one hand,
demand-side considerations appear to play a major role, with Spanish corporations reluc-
tant to attract older unemployed individuals back to the workforce. A number of reasons
(ranging from the rigidity of remuneration practices to large productivity deficits com-
pared with their younger workmates) are usually mentioned to explain this behavior. On
the other hand, searching and retraining are assumed to generate especially high wel-
fare costs for workers of advanced age. In response, legislators and policy makers have
been quick to provide particular protection for those workers (in the form of early retire-
ment programs and, in some cases, tailor-made unemployment insurance (UI) schemes
for older workers). As a result, benefits for unemployed individuals over the age of 50 are
typically higher or can be drawn for longer periods than benefits for younger unemployed
individuals. Furthermore, the conditions regarding availability for work and job-seeking
are often relaxed. Moreover, the unemployed are subject to regular (and sometimes
ad hoc) pension regulations. This scheme opens a new set of opportunities for them,
as it clearly sets the choices of the unemployed approaching retirement apart from the
choices made by their younger counterparts (see Tatsiramos (2009) for an analysis of the
behavior of young unemployed workers). In Spain (as in other EU countries), loopholes
in the rules make it feasible for older unemployed individuals to escape early retirement
penalties while enjoying the income protection of unemployment benefits (but without
suffering the pains involved in the job search process). In other words, strategic individ-
uals and corporations can use unemployment and pension rules to transfer the costs of
quasi-voluntary early retirement to the general population.2 Such practices have clear
direct costs for public finances (leading to higher taxation) as well as important oppor-
tunity costs in terms of wasted or inefficiently allocated resources. In Europe, which is
struggling to regain competitiveness and is threatened by population aging and soaring
pension costs, these considerations are having an increasing influence on the decisions of
national governments and on the recommendations of the European Commission.3
The goal of this paper is to uncover the relative contribution of bad institutional
incentives versus poor labor demand to the meager reemployment rates of Spanish work-
ers aged 55 and over. More precisely, we aim to achieve the following: (i) to quantify the
extension of the opportunistic behavior of the Spanish unemployed (those who fail to
engage in a real search effort while enjoying the income protection of the unemployment
program) and (ii) to explore feasible changes aiming to improve incentives in the cur-
rent policy design. In particular, we attempt to measure their welfare impact and financial
cost on the joint system of unemployment and old-age protection. To answer these
questions, we build, calibrate and simulate a model of optimal search and retirement
behavior adapted to the Spanish institutional environment.4 After testing the model’s
ability to match the basic empirical patterns (in a large sample of administrative records
from the Spanish Social Security System for the 2002-2008 period), we use it to simulate
the reactions to alternative institutional environments. First, we consider a theoretical
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environment in which the fiscal authorities can enforce the search request as a prerequi-
site for unemployment insurance. We then explore a real-world pension reform aimed at
eliminating the incentive for opportunistic use of the UI system: we classify individuals as
early retired immediately after they stop paying contributions (rather than when they first
claim the pension benefit). This approach should stimulate the self-selection of workers
into either early retirement or job search, even in a world of imperfect observability.
We find that our stylized model of search and retirement can very accurately reproduce
the age patterns of labor supply and reentry wages in Spain. The parameters that deliver a
good empirical match reveal an environment with rather high search costs for individuals
and poor labor demand conditions for older workers (summarized in relatively small aver-
age wage offers and a sizable chance of failing to receive any offer at all). The model
predicts widespread voluntary non-participation by the older unemployed as a rational
response to such an unfavorable labor market (given the Spanish institutional environ-
ment). Our first policy experiment illustrates the opportunistic nature of this behavior:
we find a strong increase in labor supply in the world where search requirements are
effectively implemented. This outcome leads to large savings in the net pension liabilities
of the pension system. Our main experiment, however, is more relevant for real-world
policy makers. Our feasible reform achieves appreciable increases in the labor supply and
sizable reductions in the implicit liabilities of the pension system. These financial gains
are sufficiently large to fully compensate for all the welfare losses inflicted by the reform.
Inducing search efforts among unemployed workers close to retirement is (theoretically)
cost-effective in the Spanish case.5 However, even if the change is not strictly Pareto-
improving, policy makers could judge the gains in efficiency as sufficiently large to lead
to an overall improvement in social welfare.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevance of the Spanish
case, its public institutions and the main empirical patterns. The theoretical model is dis-
cussed at length in section 3, including a discussion of the model calibration and a review
of its quantitative performance. Our simulation experiments, including our policy reform
proposal, are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 presents our overall conclusions.
Three appendices provide further details on the workings of the model (Appendix A), the
reference sample (Appendix B) and pension cost calculations (Appendix C).
2 The Spanish case
This paper focuses on the impact of pension and unemployment rules on the labor sup-
ply in Spain. Even within the context of today’s troubled European labor markets, the
Spanish situation stands out. Compared with its Europeans peers, Spain’s unemploy-
ment rate is much higher, and its employment rates for workers close to retirement are
lower (approximately 45% vs. more than 57% in the UK or Germany).6 These figures
are expected to worsen in the future, given the dramatic trend toward population aging
in Spain.7 The case of Spain is also interesting because it is relatively easy to mimic its
relevant economic institutions in a tractable economicmodel. Its institutions can bemod-
eled relatively easily because public pensions and unemployment benefits are the main
sources of income for retirees (with private pensions or housing wealth playing a largely
unimportant role) and because health insurance is also provided universally by the pub-
lic sector. Furthermore, public regulations provide well-defined and easily quantifiable
incentives.8
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The crux of our argument is that, formally, early retirement (i.e., claiming pension
benefits before the Normal Retirement Age, NRA, of 65) implies a severe permanent
reduction in pension benefits (between 6 and 8% per annum, depending on personal cir-
cumstances). However, the system also allows for an unofficial route into early retirement
through UI.9 The latter includes a very generous contributive benefit for up to two years,
followed by a small unemployment subsidy available until the pension is drawn. This sys-
tem creates a strong incentive to remain unemployed without searching for work. We can
easily find traces of this behavior in the review of the basic empirical patterns of older
workers in Spain (section 2.2). First, we describe the two basic institutions affecting older
workers’ decisions in the next section.
2.1 Institutional environment
In this section, we provide a basic overview of the main features of the Spanish
Unemployment Insurance system. These elements are reproduced in our model in
section 3. A more detailed description of the intricacies of the system can be found in
Rebollo-Sanz (2012). UI benefits in Spain (“prestación contributiva”, b(π , h)) are linked to
workers’ previous earnings, π , and to the duration of the unemployment spell, h. These
benefits can be received at any age up to the statutory NRA. These benefits are com-
puted as a percentage of the previous wage, with this percentage (the replacement rate)
decreasing with the duration of the unemployment spell (65 and 60% for the first and
second year, respectively). However, this proportionality between benefits and previous
earnings is disrupted by the existence of legal limits on minimum and maximum annual
payments, bmin and bmax, respectively. When the length of the unemployment spell
exceeds two years, the system provides a means-tested unemployment assistance benefit
(“subsidio de desempleo”) that may be received up until retirement. This subsidy is avail-
able for unemployed individuals aged 52 or over who are eligible for a retirement pension
(except for their age) provided that their income is below a quite restrictive amount. His-
torically, the size of this unemployment subsidy bsmin has been approximately 75% of the
minimum wage. As in most EU member states, the system includes a set of sanctions
to be imposed on the recipients of benefits with an insufficient attachment to the labor
market. In practice, however, these sanctions are largely overlooked (Peters et al. (2004),
section 6.2). In addition to supporting the disposable income of the unemployed, the
Unemployment Public Office (INEM) protects their future pension income by paying
payroll contributions on their behalf to the Social Security system. These contributions
are a fixed proportion of the individual “pensionable wage” (the part of labor income that
is used to determine the future pension benefit). In the system in place over the time
span covered by our data (2002-2008), INEM contributes the full previous wages of those
unemployed with a duration of less than two years (h ≤ 2) and 125% of the minimum
contribution,minC, in the case of a longer duration.
Regarding the pension system, we focus here on the “General Regime” of the system,
which is also fairly standard relative to Spain’s European counterparts.10 We focus on
the set of regulations that form the core of the system. Note, however, that after 1997, a
sequence of small changes have been progressively introduced (ending in the 2011-2013
reforms, which include quite substantial modifications of the parameters and the working
of the system). For example, the legal Early Retirement Age (ERA) for cohorts after 1967
is delayed from 60 to 61 and can be accessed only after a 6-month unemployment spell.
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As described in section 2.2, we avoid this institutional non-stationarity by focusing on
behavior between 2002 and 2008 (i.e., by focusing on cohorts born between 1937 and
1953). There remain some time-varying parameters in that period, but its quantitative
importance is minor.
The Spanish system is a pure pay-as-you-go scheme in which contributions are a fixed
proportion of covered earnings (roughly, total gross labor earnings excluding payments
for overtime work and lying within an annually legislatedmaximum,Cmax, andminimum,
Cmin, that vary based on broadly defined professional categories). An individual’s entitle-
ment to an old-age pension requires at least 15 years of contributions (a minimum of two
years must be in the eight years immediately preceding retirement) and is conditional on
having completely withdrawn from the labor force. During the time interval covered by
our analysis, the NRA was 65, but a pension could be claimed as early as 60.11 When
eligibility conditions are met, the annual individual benefit is computed as follows:
1. First, an individual-specific component B˜ linked to the worker’s age, τ , and
previous earnings, wˆ, is calculated. Formally, B˜ is the product of an age-dependent
replacement rate, μ(τ), and the worker’s accrued pension rights, wˆ. The
replacement rate is a linear function of the retirement age:12
μ(τ) =
{
μ0 + μ1(τ − ERA) ERA ≤ τ < NRA − 1
1 + μ+651 (τ − NRA) NRA ≤ τ
(1)
Hence, there is an annual penalty of μ1 percentage points for early retirement and
a bonus of μ+651 for each year after the NRA in which retirement is postponed. The
accrued pension rights, wˆ, are based on a monthly moving average of covered labor
earnings in the D years immediately before retirement: wˆτ = 1D
∑D
i=1 wτ−i.13
2. The strict proportionality between pensions and previous individual income is
disrupted by making the effective initial benefit, B(wˆ, τ), subject to a pair of




Bmin if B˜(wˆ, τ) < Bmin
B˜(wˆ, τ) if Bmin ≤ B˜(wˆ, τ) ≤ Bmax
Bmax if Bmax < B˜(wˆ, τ)
(2)
3. Finally, pension payments after retirement increase with the retail price index,
keeping B(wˆ, τ) constant in real terms throughout the pensioner’s life.
2.2 Empirical evidence
In this paper, we attempt to uncover the link between the set of rules described above and
the observed behavior of older workers in Spain. Some well-established empirical reg-
ularities strongly hint at a deep connection between pension/unemployment rules and
observed labor choices. For example, in our calibration dataset (Muestra Continua de
Vidas Laborales, referred to henceforth as MCVL), more than 55% of withdrawals from
the labor force involve the use of the UI system, with standard direct transitions from
employment into retirement. Furthermore, reemployment rates after age 50 are extremely
low. As mentioned in the introduction, the quarterly reemployment hazard in our dataset
is less than 13% for workers in the 55-59 age range and 1.5% for those in the 60-65
bracket. The self-declared search intensity of those workers is also remarkably weak.
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Figure 1 presents interesting evidence regarding the level of sensitivity to the incentives
provided by institutions. This figure displays the observed behavior of Spanish workers
conditional on the age of separation from the last job. The right-hand side of the figure
shows workers entitled to both UI contributory benefits and unemployment subsidies,
while workers on the left-hand side are covered only by the initial UI contributory bene-
fits.14 We find that workers who are made redundant in their mid-fifties (up to 58) tend
to retire at 60, the ERA, after very long unemployment spells. For example, those who
start their unemployment spell at age 54-55 (i.e., within 5 to 6 years of the ERA) retire
after being unemployed for 54 to 74 months. This pattern is largely independent of the
availability of unemployment subsidies. By contrast, the behavior of workers who lose
their jobs later is strikingly different. Those without subsidies limit their use of the unem-
ployment program to the period covered by contributive benefits and consequently retire
in large numbers after only 24 months. On the contrary, those people covered by subsi-
dies remain unemployed for much longer, which causes them to avoid early retirement
penalties.
These findings highlight the potential impact of the institutional design on individual
workers’ incentives to search for a job and/or to retire. These institutions may discourage
searching in some unemployed workers and may even foster voluntary redundancies in
some groups of employed workers. Exploring the latter behavior is especially difficult, as
it involves both the interests of workers and those of their employers. In this paper, we
focus on individual choices and thus concentrate our efforts on the search behavior of the
unemployed.15
2.2.1 Sample selection
The empirical evidence comes from the MCVL Spanish administrative dataset, which
includes information on the complete labor histories of more than one million Spanish
workers. In this paper, we focus on a relatively narrow subsample selected to guarantee
that the economic incentives of individuals are clearly identified. Namely, we consider
only males aged 55 years or older, affiliated with the General Regime of the Spanish Social
Security System who are entitled to receive contributory UI benefits and pensions upon
retirement. These individuals can be either employed or unemployed.16 This sample is
composed of 21,902 individuals with 23,763 unemployment spells (21.1% ending in a
new job and 62.6% in a transition to retirement, with the remainder being right-censored
























Exit from Unemployment to Retirement with contributive+assistance benefits
Fig. 1 Differences in retirement hazards depending on the age of dismissal and UI coverage
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unemployment duration is 16.2 months, and their average reentry wages of 1,226 euros
imply a 10% decrease relative to their previous wages (1,358 euros, on average). The aver-
age duration is longer, approximately 25.7 months, for those who exit to retirement and
much longer for those in a right-censored unemployment spell (46.7 months). A complete
description of the database, along with a detailed reduced-form econometric analysis, can
be found in García-Pérez et al. (2013).
2.2.2 Main empirical regularities
Age, unemployment spell duration and the size of the accrued pension rights emerge as
the fundamental predictors of behavior, as shown in Fig. 2, which provides a visual sum-
mary of the main behavioral regularities in the data. Each graph has age on the horizontal
axis and two lines corresponding either to a partition of the sample according to the dura-
tion of the unemployment spell (h) (on the left-hand panels) or to the size of the accrued
pension rights, wˆ (on the right-hand panels). The blue continuous line corresponds to
short unemployment spells (under 20 months) or to small accumulated pension rights
(below the 1/3 percentile of the overall empirical distribution). The green dashed line cor-
responds to long unemployment spells (more than 20 months) or to large accumulated
pension rights (above the 2/3 percentile of the distribution). The main empirical patterns
can be summarized as follows:
Retirement depends heavily on age, pension rights and, above all, unemployment dura-






































Low PR High PR
Fig. 2 Empirical patterns by age. From top to bottom: average retirement hazard (U → R), re-entry hazard
(U → E), and re-entry wages, conditional on (left column) unemployment duration, h, and (right column)
accrued pension rights, PR
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has been well documented in the study of transitions starting from employment (e.g.,
Boldrin et al. (1999) or Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez-Martín (2007)), the relevance of
duration has largely been overlooked in previous studies.
Reemployment has a well-documented negative dependence on unemployment dura-
tion, with the short-term unemployed showing significantly greater reemployment haz-
ards at all ages considered (see the left-middle panel in Fig. 2). The graphs also illustrate
a strong negative dependence on age (less well documented) that is attenuated to some
extent after the ERA. Finally, workers with high pension rights reenter employment in
much smaller proportions after the age of 58, but the opposite is observed in the preceding
years.17
Reentry wages (see the lower panels of Fig. 2) do not show much variation by age
or unemployment duration, but they are appreciably greater for workers with large
accumulated pension rights.
Finally, it is important to recall from Fig. 1 that being entitled to unemployment sub-
sidies leads to different behavior, particularly with regard to retirement. In particular,
workers without the ability to collect unemployment subsidies are strong contributors to
the flows of early retirement in the data (at ages 60 and 61).
3 Themodel
Individuals must make some genuinely difficult economic decisions at the end of their
professional careers. To choose wisely, they must understand the institutional environ-
ment; the present and future state of the economy; and the idiosyncratic uncertainties
surrounding their income, health and survival probabilities. Including all relevant fac-
tors in a model is currently not feasible. As a first step, we proceed with a very simple
model that is designed to capture the basic institutional aspects of the problem and the
most important sources of uncertainty faced by both employees and the unemployed.
A key simplification is that we consider a group of healthy workers (i.e., ignoring the
exit route via disability benefits) and, by focusing on the pre-crisis interval 2002-2008,
assume that they operate in an stationary environment (i.e., not considering recent pen-
sion reforms). We also leave business cycle considerations for future work.18 As a result,
we interpret our findings as robust lower-bound estimations of the extension of voluntary
unemployment.19
We consider individuals who behave as rational utility maximizers endowed with a
correct understanding of the economic environment. Such individuals may live up to
T years (100 in our baseline calibration), but they are subject to a mortality risk rep-
resented at each age a by the set of conditional probabilities of surviving to age a′,
Sa(a′), 55 ≤ a < a′ ≤ T . Both the employed and the unemployed face additional uncer-
tainty related to the labormarket. The employed face an age-varying risk of dismissal, δ(.),
while the unemployed who are seeking jobs are uncertain about the arrival of job offers,
λ(.), and their associated wages, w. There are no other sources of risk in the model.
Individual preferences are represented by a constant intertemporal discount factor,
β , and by a period utility function u(y, l). Utility is assumed to be increasing with the
flow of income (y) and with the amount of leisure (l) associated with the action taken
by the individual in the period considered.20 The precise functional form of this func-
tion is discussed in section 3.2. Individual rationality implies that, starting in their
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early fifties, individuals choose their labor status in each period such that the result-
ing sequences of income and leisure flows maximize their expected discounted utility
Ua = E
[∑T
i=a β i−a u(yi, li)
]
at each age. The institutional environment is as described
in section 2.1, with the exception that we simplify the dynamics of the accrued pension
rights, wˆ (because reproducing the exact formula in the model implies extreme computa-
tional costs). We simply assume that for an individual with a current labor income w, the
one-year update in pension rights is as follows:21
wˆτ+1 = wˆτ + w − wˆτD (3)
3.1 Recursive representation of the individual problem: labor states and individual
decisions
As usual with complex life-cycle, stochastic models, we actually work with a recursive
formulation of the individual problem in the age range of interest (55 to 68). At the begin-
ning of each period (assumed to represent one year of biological time), individuals may
find themselves in one of three mutually exclusive labor states: Employment, Unemploy-
ment or Retirement (E,U ,R). In our model retirement is a passive state, so we only have
to consider the choices of the employed and the unemployed, which are as follows:
• At the beginning of period a, the employed can either remain in work for the rest of
the period or retire. The life-cycle utility derived in each case is represented by the
worker’s value functions EWa (.) and ERa (.), respectively. They provide the present,
discounted utility derived from the current choice and from behaving optimally in all
subsequent periods. The total value of being employed at the beginning of each






• Unemployed workers have three possible courses of action at the beginning of
period a: search for a new job, remain unemployed without searching
(non-participation) or retire immediately. The life-cycle utility associated with each
of those options is represented by the value functions USa(), UNa () and URa (). The total






The following paragraphs review the optimal choices in each labor state and the
construction of their associated value functions.
3.1.1 Labor choices among unemployedworkers
The main focus of our modeling effort in this paper is the behavior of the unemployed. As
indicated above, a worker starting a period as unemployed can retire, search for a new job
or remain unemployed without searching. The economic value of each of these options is
as follows:
1. Retirement Our model treats retirement as an absorbing state (which is roughly in
line with the very low employment rate observed among Spanish pensioners).
Individuals take no further actions in this state and simply collect the pension
benefit B and enjoy the full allocation of their time endowment, l, to leisure. Thus,
the only personal information needed to compute the economic value of this
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option is the accrued pension rights wˆ at the beginning of the period. The




β i−a Sa(i)u(B(wˆ, a), l¯ ) (6)
where B(wˆ, a) is computed according to the Spanish institutional rules (eq. (1) and
(2)). We only consider retirement at ages equal to or above the ERA (as a result of
our extreme borrowing constraints assumption).
2. Non-participation (i.e., inactivity while in the UI system) In accordance with
the empirical evidence presented in section 2.2, we allow the unemployed to
choose inactivity while remaining in the UI program. By proceeding in this
manner, the unemployed avoid all the costs associated with an active labor search.
This comes at the price of forgoing any chance of receiving a job offer in the
immediately ensuing period. To compute the current unemployment benefit, b, we
now need to store the value of the wage in the previous employment spell, π , and
the duration of the current unemployment spell in years, h. We also need to keep
track of the accumulated pension rights, wˆ, to compute the value of future
retirement. Formally, the value of the inactivity choice at age a is:
UNa (π , wˆ, h) = u(b(π , h), l¯) + βa+1 VUa+1(π , wˆ′, h + 1) (7)
where βa+1 = β Sa(a + 1) is the total discounting factor at age a, VUa+1(.) is the
value of starting the following period as unemployed (defined in eq. (5)) and wˆ′ is
the future value of the accrued pension rights (updated according to expression
(3)). It should be noted that the value of leisure in this state is assumed to be equal
to that enjoyed under retirement, l¯. We are assuming that our unemployed workers
are, therefore, effectively exempted from any job-search requirements labor
authorities may impose.
3. Job Search The value of becoming involved in an active job search is represented
by USa(.) and depends on the same set of economic characteristics (π , wˆ, h) as in
the non-participation state. It is the sum of two factors: (1) the immediate utility of
searching u(b(π , h), lS), where we combine the income from the unemployment
benefit and a reduced value of leisure (lS < l¯) that reflects the costs of searching
and re-training; and (2) the expected future value from search, EVS:
USa(π , wˆ, h) = u(b(π , h), lS) + βa+1 EVSa+1(π , wˆ′, h + 1) (8)
The general expression of the expected future value is:




VUa (π , wˆ, h),EWa (w, wˆ)
}]+ (1−λ(.))VUa (π , wˆ, h),
(9)
where VUa is the value function associated to starting period a as unemployed
(eq. (5)) and where the rate of arrival of job offers λ(.) is a function of age and
unemployment duration.
The search option is risky because future job offers may involve relatively low
wages and (if λ(.) < 1) they may even fail to materialize altogether. The EVS term
captures these two uncertainties, together with the utility value arising in each
eventuality. The first of the two sums in EVS captures the expected value of future
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wages once a job offer has materialized, while the second sum captures the residual
value when the search effort fails and no job offer is forthcoming. In more detail:
(1) If the offer of a job paying wage w is received, the individual must decide
whether to accept or reject it. To find the best choice, the worker
compares the expected utility from reemployment at wage w, EWa+1(w, wˆ′),
to the utility of starting the next period as unemployed VUa+1(π , wˆ′, h + 1).
The utility of employment is presented in eq. (11) below. It is considered
in expected terms because the size of the wage offer is uncertain at the
beginning of the search process. It should be noted that rejecting a job
offer will normally result in a depreciation of the value of being
unemployed (due to both the reduction in benefits over the course of the
unemployment spell and the updating of the accrued pension rights).22
As usual in the literature, the job-acceptance decision is summarized, for
each possible value of the state variables, by the corresponding
Reservation Wage, wa(π , wˆ, h). This is defined as the wage level that
makes the unemployed indifferent between employment at that wage or
staying unemployed for one more period. Formally:
EWa (wa(π , wˆ, h), wˆ) = VUa (π , wˆ, h) (10)
(2) If no offer arrives or if the offer received is unacceptable, the associated
value is that of staying unemployed one more period, i.e., VUa (π , wˆ, h).
Formally, the ex ante probability of this outcome is 1 − λ(.) (1 − F(w′)),
where w′ stands for the next period’s reservation wage, wa+1(π , wˆ′, h+ 1),
and F is the cumulative distribution function of future wage offers.
Overall, the optimal choice for the unemployed is found by comparingURa ,UNa andUSa ,
as already indicated in eq. (5).
3.1.2 Labor choices among employees
Currently employed workers have a choice between retiring immediately or remaining
employed for one more period. In this paper, we do not allow the employed to move into
voluntary unemployment.23 The value function associated to remaining employed is:
EWa (w, wˆ) = u(w, lW ) + βa
[
(1 − δ(.))VEa+1(w, wˆ′) + δ(.)VUa+1(w, wˆ′, 1)
]
(11)
The current utility depends on the salary and on the amount of leisure left after comply-
ing with all the professional activities (lW < l). Future utility is uncertain, as workers face
both survival uncertainty and the risk of being fired and starting the next period as unem-
ployed. The risk of dismissal, δ(.), is an exogenous function of the worker’s characteristics.
We assume constant real wages and update pension rights, wˆ, as in eq. (3).
The value of retirement at age a, ERa (w), is formally identical to that in (6) for the case of
unemployed workers. Again, we assume that a direct transition into retirement is possible
only after the ERA. All in all, the optimal choice for the employee is found by comparing
EWa (w, wˆ) and ERa (w) as indicated in (4).
The basic properties of the behavior generated by our model (along with its ability to
match the observed Spanish data) are discussed in the next section, while the reader inter-
ested in a formal exploration of optimal behavior will find a more detailed analysis in
Appendix A.
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3.2 The calibration
This section describes how we align the theoretical model in the previous section to
Spain’s economic circumstances during the interval 2002-2008. We follow a calibration
approach: First, we assign values to the model unobservable parameters to reproduce
some basic stylized facts obtained from our sample. Then, we aggregate the model
predictions for each individual in our reference sample and compare the results to
their in-sample counterparts (along both calibrated and non-calibrated dimensions). The
process is iterated until a satisfactory set of parameters is found.
The model’s parameters can be classified into two broad categories depending on the
availability of observable empirical counterparts. On the observable side, we have the
parameters controlling human longevity, the institutional details of pension and unem-
ployment schemes and the distributions by observable characteristics. The group without
direct empirical counterparts includes the parameters of individual preferences and those
that control the demand side of the labor market. This second group of parameters is
calibrated to reproduce the average age-profiles of re-entry and retirement rates and the
accepted wages of individuals re-entering employment.24 Exceptionally, the discount fac-
tor, β = 1/(1 + r), and the degree of risk aversion, η, are set to the standard values found
elsewhere in the literature (see Table 2).
3.2.1 Observable parameters
We explore the labor behavior of individuals in the 55-68 age range, assuming an annual
time-frame for individual choices. The initial distribution of workers by “type” (with and
without unemployment subsidies) and according to our state variables (age, unemploy-
ment duration, previous wages and accrued pension rights) corresponds to the sample
average observed in the 2002-2008 period.25 The continuous state variables (π , wˆ) ∈
× Wˆ are discretized as part of our numerical procedure.26 Survival probabilities are set
according to mortality tables provided by INE (Spain’s Institute of Statistics) for the sam-
ple period. The values of the model’s institutional parameters are summarized in Table 1.
The unemployment benefit b is set to 65% of the previous wage during the first year of the
unemployment spell, and to 60% during the second (albeit necessarily ranging between
a floor bmin and a ceiling bmax). For longer spells, workers are divided according to their
entitlement to social assistance (bsmin). Retirement pensions are first available at the age of
Table 1 Institutional non-calibrated parameters: values assigned to observable parameters in the
benchmark economy (all nominal amounts are expressed in thousands of 2002 euros)
Pensions Unemployment
Early/Normal Ret. age 60-65 Benefit coverage h=1 0.65
Annual early ret. penalty, μ1 0.07 Benefit coverage h=2 0.6
Initial replacement rate, μ0 0.65
Bonus Post 65, μ+651 0.02
Maximum pensions, Bmax 26.69 Maximum benefit, bmax 10.1
Minimum pensions, Bmin 6.14 Minimum benefit, bmin 4.68
Minimum pensions, B65min 6.63 Unemployment subsidy, b
s
min 4.0
Lags in pension formula, D 15
Social contributions
Pay-roll rate, ς 0.356 Minimum contribution, Cmin 7.29
Maximum contribution, Cmax 31.29 Min. contrib. subsidy, Csmin 6.2
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60, with an annual early-retirement penalty of 7%. wˆ is computed to approximate a mov-
ing average of the 15 years immediately before retirement (according to eq. (3)). A full
pension is granted at the NRA of 65 (with a 2% annual bonus for those that retire after
the “legal” age). The minimum and maximum pensions are regularly changed as part of
the annual government budget. The average values for the period are reproduced here.
Finally, the pension and unemployment systems are financed with a fixed contribution
rate of 35.6% of the covered wage (gross labor income, with a minimum Cmin = 7.3 and a
maximum Cmax = 29.8 thousand euros). The covered wage applied to workers receiving
the unemployment subsidy is 6,200 euros.
The calibration of the observable parameters is completed with the exogenous dismissal
rates δa(w, wˆ). At each age, we make a partition of the sample according to the 1/3 and 2/3
percentiles of the distribution of wages and pension rights. We set the exogenous value
of δ to the empirical value observed in each cell of the partition. The resulting rates range
from 3.8% to 14.6%.
3.2.2 Unobservable parameters
Table 2 presents the calibrated preference and labor-market parameters, while Fig. 3
shows the quality of the match between the model and the data resulting from these
parameters. Preferences are represented with a discount factor β = 1/(1 + r) and an
additively separable and age-invariant function of income y and labor state, e:
u(y, e) = [ y (1 + ν(e)) ]
1−η
1 − η with ν(e) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if e = E
ls if e = S
l if e = (R,N)
η measures the curvature of the objective function and ν(e) represents the variation,
with the labor state, in the value of the time not devoted to labor-market activities.
We normalize this value to zero for employees and assume a positive value (l) for non-
participants and retirees and a smaller one (ls) for unemployed job seekers (i.e., we
parameterize it as an Added Value of Income, AVI). ls is smaller than l to capture the
costs associated with the search process, including the cost of re-training and the possible
“stigma” cost of remaining unemployed. We take standard values for β and η, while the
leisure parameters l and ls are identified from their impact on re-entry rates and accepted
wages.27
Labor market properties are captured by the job-offer rate λ and the associated distri-
bution of offered wages, Fw. The job-offer arrival rate is assumed to depend on age and
on the duration of the unemployment spell:
λa(h) = λ0 · [ 1 − I(h > 1)λh] · [ 1 − I(a > 59)λa]
Table 2 Values assigned to unobservable parameter in the benchmark economy
Preferences Labor Market parameters
β 0.97 Annual discount factor λ0 0.6 Base job-offer arrival rate
η 2 Risk aversion λh 0.5 Factor reduction in λ due to h > 1
l¯ 0.3 Leisure AVI (Retirement) λa 0.8 Factor reduction in λ due to a > 59
lS 0.0 Leisure AVI (search) μ 9.7 Wage offer mean (thousands of 2002 euros)
σ 8.9 Wage offer dispersion (std)
AVI added value of income
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Fig. 3 Benchmark theoretical predictions (green, dashed line) vs. empirical data (blue, continuous line):
retirement U → R and reemployment U → E hazards (top panels), average accepted reemployment wages,
AAW, (bottom left panel) and exogenous transitions into unemployment E → U (bottom right panel)
where I(.) represents an indicator function of a particular event (being in long-term
unemployment or older than 59). If we keep λ constant in our model, we still predict
a drop in re-entry rates as the individual grows older, but the quantitative impor-
tance of this process is smaller than in the data. For longer durations, however, the
model with fixed λ predicts decreasing reservation wages and increasing re-entry rates
(in contrast to the evidence). Therefore, to match the process of “hysteresis” observed
in the data we must impose a decreasing rate of job-offers from the model’s supply
side. Finally, the wage associated with each job offer is assumed to be log-normally
distributed, with mean μ and variance σ 2. The parameters with the best empirical
fit (Table 2) indicate a fairly large dispersion of offered wages around a very modest
average.
All in all, the results of the calibration exercise reveal two important properties of
the search process. First and foremost, large search costs are needed to rationalize the
observed data. An unemployed person actively searching for a job experiences a rela-
tive drop in leisure (vis a vis a similar inactive unemployed person) equivalent to that
suffered by a full-time worker (vis a vis a retiree of similar characteristics). Secondly,
searching is also considerably risky. The probability of a person who has been unem-
ployed for less than a year receiving an acceptable job offer is between 20 and 30%
(at the age of 55) and drops slightly with age (as the reservation wages increase). At
the age of 60 those probabilities fall to the 12-22% range. For the long-term unem-
ployed, this probability is around 15%. This is partly endogenous (due to relatively high
reservation wages), but largely the result of the poor dynamism of the Spanish labor
market.
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3.3 Empirical performance of the model
Figure 3 assesses the success of our calibration strategy by comparing the data and the
model predictions in the three targeted dimensions (reemployment and retirement rates
by age and re-entry wages by age). It is apparent that our highly stylized model does
remarkably well at reproducing the broad empirical patterns by age. It should be empha-
sized that the model’s ability to capture the general trends in the data is not the result
of the exogenous process assumed for the rate of arrival of job offers. The assumed
exogenous trends by age and duration help to fit the data quantitatively, but the model
reproduces most qualitative patterns even with a constant λ. Going beyond the calibrated
dimensions, Fig. 4 compares the differences in behavior for the long vs. short-term unem-
ployed and for workers in the two tails of the distribution by pension rights. To facilitate
the comparison with the data, the graphs are arranged in a similar way to those in Fig. 2.
Additionally, Figs. 10 and 11 in Appendix A.2 directly compare the data and predictions
for each disaggregated group. There are some quantitative discrepancies, but the model
does a generally good job in reproducing the actions of workers of different character-
istics. For example, its ability to match the re-entry and retirement patterns of workers
with different pension rights is especially outstanding. There are two areas in which the
model underperforms: (i) it fails to generate the large differences observed in the data
between the re-entry wages of workers with high vs. low pension rights, and (ii) it fails to
predict any direct retirement among the short-term unemployed (while there is a small
proportion in the data). These two drawbacks (especially the first one) can be addressed
to some extent by introducing some additional structure into the model. This extra com-
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Fig. 4 Model predictions by age. From top to bottom: average retirement hazard (U → R), re-entry hazard
(U → E), and re-entry wages, conditional on (left column) unemployment duration, h, and (right column)
accrued pension rights, PR
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of the resulting model.28 Overall, we find that the benchmark model strikes a good bal-
ance between the expected empirical performance and the need for a relatively simple,
transparent framework for policy analysis.
4 Simulation analysis: search and pension reforms in Spain
Once equipped with a fully calibrated quantitative model, we are in a position to explore
the extension of voluntary non-search behavior and the type of workers more likely to
be involved in it. These are the tasks assigned to section 4.1. We then ask ourselves to
what extent the low reemployment rate is a product of non-search behavior. For a first
assessment, we simulate an alternative institutional environment in which this type of
behavior is precluded by design (section 4.2). In section 4.3 we then consider a parametric
reform of the pension/unemployment rules capable of delivering part of the advantages
of a stronger attachment to the labor market. It is in this final environment where we
explore the cost-effectiveness of fostering the job search effort.
4.1 Voluntary non-participation in the benchmark economy
Table 3 displays the aggregate predictions of our benchmark model for the individuals in
our reference sample. The overall non-participation figures can be found under the “NP”
heading on the 5th column in the table. More disaggregated results by age are shown in
the bottom-right panel of Fig. 5. The numbers are large: the best possible course of action
for more than half the individuals (in the 60-64 age range) is to remain unemployed with-
out searching. Before the ERA, this choice is largely confined to long-term unemployed
workers (see Fig. 9 in Appendix A.2). However, once the age of 60 has been reached, it
becomes more widespread, affecting a majority of those who have been unemployed for
less than two years. Only workers with very small pension rights (who prefer to search)
and the very long-term unemployed (who opt for retirement) shy away from voluntary
non-participation. The non-participation decision of a large part of the unemployed may
have major consequences for the financial balance of the public insurance mechanisms.
To assess this factor, we calculate the financial burden represented by each of our sam-
ple individuals on the combined “pension & unemployment” system. More precisely, we
compute each individual’s Net Pension Cost (NPC): the expected discounted value of the
flow of future pension and unemployment payments received from the system, net of any
Table 3 Simulation Results: Proportion of workers whose optimal decision is to retire (Ret), Search or
stay inactive (NP); reemployment hazard (Reenter, in brackets); NPC1 annuity is the Net Pension Cost
in thousands of euros per person; Pension savings is the difference between the NPC1 after each
reform and the one in the BASE. EV1 is the welfare change (reformed vs. BASE economy) measured
by an Equivalent Variation. Both NPC1 and EV1 apply only to the unemployed with durations of less
than 1 year
Economy Age range Labor supply NPC1 Pension EV1
Ret Search (Reenter) NP Annuity savings
BASE 55-59 0 65.0 (14.5) 35.0
60-65 29.2 11.6 (3.2) 59.2 12.92
PLE: Perfect 55-59 0 83.2 (19.7) 16.8
Law Enforcement 60-65 36.6 59.1 (16.0) 4.3 11.71 1.21
Separate 55-59 0 70.2 (15.9) 29.8
μ 60-65 59.3 30.6 (7.0) 10.1 11.38 1.54 0.90
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Fig. 5 PLE Experiment, inobservables:: Model predictions in the benchmark economy (-) versus an economy
with perfect enforcement of the legal search requirements, PLE (- -)
future social contributions paid into the system. The calculation incorporates the optimal
individual behavior in each possible labor state and is a function of each person’s observ-
able characteristics. The formal definition of the NPC is provided in Appendix C. The
total NPC is then converted into an equivalent annuity to facilitate the comparison with
the welfare measure used below. In our benchmark simulation, we find that, on average,
workers at the beginning of their unemployment spell (ie, with h = 1) are owed 197,000
euros by the public insurance system (NPC1 value in Table 3). This is equivalent to an
annual cost of almost 13,000 euros. These values will provide the yardstick to measure
the potential financial gains (and welfare impact) of alternative institutional environments
in the following sections. Yet before making that comparison, we address the question of
whether the widespread resort to non-search behavior will vanish in an environment with
more labor-friendly institutions and, more importantly, whether such a change will have
a major impact on observed employment rates.
4.2 Perfect enforcement of the search requirement (PLE)
According to current Spanish legislation, the collection of the contributory unemploy-
ment benefit is conditional on being actively involved in the search for a new job.
However, this requirement is hardly ever implemented in practice. This section explores
the consequences of a perfect enforcement of this rule. We assume that all the unem-
ployed who decide to stay inactive will receive only the minimum unemployment subsidy,
bmin, rather than the contributory benefit corresponding to their individual character-
istics. This is tantamount to assuming that the system can monitor the decisions of
individuals, which, for obvious reasons, is hardly realistic. This is, however, an interesting
environment for quantifying the maximum loss of labor supply and pension costs due to
the tolerance of opportunistic behavior by the unemployed.
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The experiment’s results are reproduced in the 5th and 6th rows in Table 3 and in Fig. 5.
Two powerful messages clearly emerge: first, the voluntary choice of non-search behavior
becomes rather marginal before the ERA and essentially disappears after the age of 60.
Second, most individuals who preferred to stay inactive in the benchmark will now opt for
an active search. This new behavior is specially prevalent among workers with short dura-
tions and average or above average pension rights. As a result, average re-entry rates and
wages spectacularly escalate (by comparison to the benchmark) in the 58-64 age range.
Even when dealing with a remarkably weak labormarket for older workers, our simulation
predicts a steady re-entry rate of almost 20% before the age of 60 and of 16% between the
ERA and 65. There is some increase in the incidence of retirement, but its quantitative
importance is small. These results suggest that better incentives can potentially generate
large efficiency gains in the Spanish case. However, whether all those potential gains can
actually be achieved by a real-world reform remains to be seen. The next section seeks
to capture some of those gains by changing the pension rules applied to those that access
retirement via unemployment.
4.3 Reform of the pension rules applied when retiring from unemployment
A key reason why inactivity is appealing in our benchmark scenario is because the indi-
vidual pension value typically increases while the worker remains unemployed. This is a
result of the automatic reduction in the early retirement penalties as retirement is delayed.
In contrast, the value of the accrued pension rights tends to diminish, but the former
effect is typically greater. As a result, severing this link is a direct way of preventing vol-
untary inactivity. This can be achieved in a straightforward manner by making the early
retirement penalty dependant on the age when the worker stops paying social contribu-
tions (rather than on the age when the individual claims the pension benefit for the first
time, as is currently the case). This reform amounts to changing the replacement rateμ(a)
in eq. (1) to μ(a − h). Let us consider, for example, somebody made redundant the day
before his/her 60th birthday. If wˆ60 represents the value of their accrued pension rights,
an immediate retirement would result in a pension benefit of 0.65 × wˆ60. Delaying retire-
ment by one year increases this value to 0.72 × wˆ61. In contrast, under the new system
the incentive to remain inactive while collecting unemployment benefits disappears: after
one year, the pension replacement rate will still be 65% of pension rights.29 Unfortu-
nately, eliminating the “perverse” incentives hidden in the current rules comes at a price:
a very harsh treatment of the unemployed that search unsuccessfully. We would conse-
quently expect the unemployed with low reemployment prospects to largely self-select
into retirement after the reform.
Figure 6 and the bottom rows in Table 3 illustrate the results of this reform. The
labor supply consequences are appreciable despite the harsh treatment of unsuccessful
searches: the proportion of unemployed workers that opt for searching almost triples in
the 60-64 age range, leading to a twofold increase in reemployment rates. These higher
re-entry rates also reflects a drop in reservation wages, brought about by a clear ero-
sion of the value of delayed retirement. Searching, however, changes little before the ERA
(as there is nothing in the reform to encourage job seeking among those that are sim-
ply waiting to claim the pension benefit at 60). The strongest impact is felt, as expected,
on retirement (which also sees a twofold increase in its incidence rate). The changes in
behavior are concentrated among the short-term unemployed aged 59 or over. Those with
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Fig. 6 Pension reform Experiment, observables: Model predictions in the benchmark economy (-) vs. the
reformed economy (Early retirement penalties fixed at the effective age of withdrawal from employment) (- -)
average or below average pension rights tend to intensify their search effort, while those
with above average pension rights tend to choose to retire earlier than in the benchmark.
The budgetary consequences of the reform are also very important. In the new envi-
ronment, pensions are less generous and workers remain in the labor force longer, paying
more contributions. As a result, the net financial condition of the combined Social Secu-
rity system records a rather healthy improvement. On average, each new unemployed
person in our sample costs the system 174,000 euros, which is a 12% reduction from
the 197,300 estimated in the benchmark. In terms of the compensating annuity, the aver-
age annual savings amount to more than 1,500 euros per worker. Part of these financial
gains stems from the extra product generated by all the new employment induced by the
reform. Unfortunately, a significant part of these gains also arises from the relatively large
pension drops incurred as the duration of the unemployment spell increases. It is there-
fore essential to explore whether these financial gains are large enough to compensate for
the welfare losses the reform inflicts upon some workers.
To test for the possibility of an overall welfare improvement, we compute the Equivalent
Variation (EV) associated with the introduction of this institutional change (in relation to
the initial benchmark). For each individual, the EV is defined as the income they would
be willing to forgo (measured as an annual constant payment) to avoid the introduction
of the reform under study.30 Table 4 shows the simulated figures. We focus on the results
obtained for those at the beginning of the unemployment spell, on the understanding that
the change would not be retroactively imposed on the long-term unemployed at the start
of the reform.
The reform has a generally negative impact on the welfare of the individuals in our
sample; yet the size of the welfare losses is small in most cases. On average, an annuity
of 900 euros would be enough to guarantee the initial utility level after the reform. This
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Table 4 Pension reform. Net pension savings and welfare changes (Equivalent Variation for workers
starting their unemployment scheme, EV1) from the pension reform. The EV is presented in absolute
terms and as a % of previous wages. Pension savings and absolute EVs are averages by age in
thousands of 2002 euros
Age Pension savings EV1 EV1 (% previous wage)
55 0.12 0.07 0.37
56 0.12 0.07 0.35
57 0.09 0.09 0.46
58 0.16 0.03 0.10
59 1.71 0.99 3.91
60 2.61 1.80 7.22
61 2.30 1.39 5.80
62 2.19 1.23 5.18
63 1.85 1.16 5.09
64 0.85 0.62 2.94
65 0.05 0.0 0.0
Average 1.48 0.92 3.86
is equivalent to, on average, slightly less than (a permanent drop of) 3.8 % of the annual
wage earned in the last employment spell. A quite substantial variation in the welfare
impact lies behind the average figure. The most important losses are concentrated in the
60-64 age range, peaking at the ERA. For the workers observed at that age, the damage
inflicted by the reform is, on average, around 7% of the previous wage. But the pain is
also rather unequally spread according to previous wages and pension rights (figures not
shown in the Table). Some workers (those that chose to retire before the reform) avoid
losses entirely, while those that choose not to participate in the benchmark are rather
heavily hit. In absolute terms, the largest Equivalent Variation occurs among the unem-
ployed with high previous wages and pension rights, peaking at above 3,000 euros. In
relative terms, losses are higher among the unemployed with low previous wages and
average pension rights (with maximums peaking above 12% of previous wages).
To explore these heterogenous effects further, Fig. 7 decomposes the welfare losses
induced by the reform (and also the associated pension savings) according to the changes
in behavior generated. The left-hand panels reflect the impact on workers whose behavior
is unchanged, while the right-hand panels reproduce the consequences for workers that
change behavior (from non-participation to both retirement and search, and from search
to retirement). Note that a few more combinations of choices are possible, but their rel-
evance in our sample is negligible. The sample distribution of the combinations explored
is provided in Table 5. Two clear messages emerge from the graphs in Fig. 7. First, work-
ers observed before the age of 58 and workers opting for retirement before the reform
are unaffected. All other workers are affected. Second, welfare losses are greater among
the unemployed whose previous optimal choice was to remain unemployed without
searching.
In principle, the income saved by the pension authorities could be channeled to the
workers experiencing welfare losses after the reforms. To explore this possibility, Fig. 7
also shows the net pensions savings generated by the reform (expressed as an annuity
and averaged by age). The overall value obtained in the entire sample is 1,500 euros, well
above the 0.9 needed to offset the welfare losses. The graphs display where this differ-
ence is obtained. For the unemployed whose actions are unchanged, the pension savings
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Fig. 7 Pension reform. Net pension savings and welfare changes (absolute values in thousands of euros)
according to the change in behavior induced by the reform
and welfare losses are almost identical. Appreciable differences appear only once behavior
has been modified. When the reform leads to shifts from searching into retirement, the
result is negative (net pension liabilities increase). These situations are, however, a very
small proportion of the total (less than 1%). In all other cases, the savings are substantially
higher than the compensations (especially when the change in behavior is from non-
participation to search). Overall, the simulated financial savings achieved by the reform
more than compensate for the welfare losses generated. We can conclude that, if the labor
market conditions remain unaltered after the reform, the simulated experiment leads to a
net welfare improvement.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the relative contributions of bad institutional incentives versus poor
labor demand conditions to the meager reemployment rates of Spanish workers aged 55
and over. Seen from an European perspective, the Spanish system of pension and unem-
ployment insurance creates particularly strong incentives for older unemployed workers
to remain inactive. This alternative exit route typically implies a two-year delay between
the age when a worker effectively stops searching and the age when the pension benefit
is formally claimed (collecting unemployment benefits in the meantime). But for house-
holds lacking other sources of income, this gap can be much larger (as a result of specific
Table 5 Pension reform. Sample distribution (in %) of the changes in behavior induced by the reform
Unchanged behavior Change behavior
RET Search NP NP to Search NP to Ret Search to Ret
Prob 12.0 38.7 5.7 20.8 22.4 0.3
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unemployment subsidies). Using a search and retirement model, we have documented the
rationality and widespread extension of these phenomena among the unemployed aged
55-67 over the 2002-2008 interval. The prevalence of this practice enhances the welfare
of certain specific groups of workers at the expense of the general fiscal burden borne
by the Spanish taxpayer. This paper explores a feasible pension reform that effectively
terminates the incentive to remain inactive without searching. In our reformed environ-
ment, older workers are forced to either intensify their search effort or accept standard
early retirement penalties in the event of an early withdrawal. Our simulations predict
that this reform generates sufficient pension savings to more than compensate for all
the welfare costs incurred. Overall, the paper provides academic support for the con-
venience of reforms that effectively eliminate the alternative early retirement routes via
unemployment (e.g., mirroring the recent legislative changes implemented in Germany
and Finland).
Our modeling exercise is only a first step in the greater research efforts needed to
understand the interactions of pensions and labor supply behavior at advanced ages. We
focused on the (relatively narrow) pre-crisis sample and ignored wealth accumulation
and health issues. These simplifications allow for a stationary approach to the prob-
lem that renders a numerical solution of the problem feasible. Future analysis should
address the aspects that we have excluded from consideration in our first attempt
(the role of the business cycle, redundancy payments and the uncertainty created by
ever-changing pension rules). By extending the reference sample, our findings will pro-
gressively approximate full population predictions. Nevertheless, we view our results as
a robust minimum bound on the extension of voluntary non-participation and as a first
policy proposal on what action may be taken to mitigate this issue. Another avenue
for future improvement involves general equilibrium considerations: our partial equilib-
rium analysis detaches itself from the impact of institutional changes on prices and labor
demand. It is highly unlikely that the induced second-round effects of the reforms would
change our qualitative conclusions, but they would most certainly affect our quantitative
answers.
Endnotes
1In the 2000-2010 Spanish Labor Force Survey, fewer than 27% of the unemployed
aged 50-54 declared that they were actively seeking a new job. This number fell to fewer
than 11% for those over age 60.
2There is a recent strand of the literature that discusses possible justifications for
“Canada Dry pensions” (the authority-sanctioned misuse of unemployment benefits).
Some examples are Bhattacharya et al. (2004), Cremer et al. (2006) or Hairault et al.
(2012).
3In its latest white paper, Commission (2012), European authorities have placed the
goal to “restrict access to early retirement schemes and other early exit pathways” at the
top of its five recommendations, second only to the task of linking retirement ages to
increases in life expectancy. In fact, several countries have recently adopted measures
such as restricting the duration of unemployment benefits, extending the supervision of
job search activities to the older unemployed, increasing the age limits for the principle
of “availability to work” and changing the rules on rejecting job offers for those with
unemployment benefits. In countries such us Germany or Finland, the early exit route
via unemployment has already largely been closed.
4We focus on the Spanish economy, but (as discussed in section 2) we note that other
European economies face issues similar to those analyzed in this paper.
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5Note, however, that real-world applicability is non-trivial, even in our main
experiment. We should account for implementation costs and the difficulty of
identifying those targeted for the compensation (unemployed individuals who search
but fail to reenter the workforce).
6The majority of the population aged 55 or more is out of the labor force. The average
unemployment rate was 6.9% between 2000 and 2010 (according to the Spanish Labor
Force Survey), which is well above European averages but smaller than the figure for the
rest of the population (8.6% rate for workers aged 25 to 54). Note also that only a small
proportion of the non-participant population in the 50-59 age range classify themselves
as retired (only 6.6% according to the 2000-2010 EPA).
7At the moment, there are 4 people available for work (in the 18-64 age range) for each
potential retiree (workers aged 65 or over). This figure is expected to decrease below 1.5
by 2050.
8This statement is true at least for cohorts beginning working before 1967, who
constitute the bulk of our sample. Later cohorts have suffered an endless string of
increasingly complex pension changes, starting with the 1997 reform.
9Disability pensions are another alternative exit gateway, although they have been
more strictly monitored in recent times. See, e.g., Boldrin et al. (1999).
10The system is rather complex (for a detailed description, see, e.g., Boldrin et al.
(1999)), and we abstract some of its relatively minor details. In particular, we do not
cover certain tailor-made early retirement routes made possible under the legal figure of
a “Special Agreement.” Those options are arranged on an individual basis but typically
involve some cooperation with employers (sometimes in connection with collective
redundancies).
11The 2011-2013 reform is progressively increasing the NRA to 67 for most workers.
The ERA was increased after the 1997 reform to 61 and then to 63 by the 2011 reform,
but because of the long implementation phases for these reforms, these changes do not
affect the workers covered by our analysis. The total exclusion of pension and labor
earnings is also revised in the 2013 changes.
12We do not include a penalty linked to an insufficient number of contributive years
(35, which increased to 37.5 in the 2011-2013 reform), which may have a minor effect on
the pensions of a small number of workers in our sample. We also ignore the effects of
income taxation.
13Note that we implement an annual version of the legal formula, which is defined in
terms of monthly contributions.
14The main difference between these two groups is that workers in the first group are
entitled to unemployment subsidies after exhausting contributive subsidies because of a
lack of income, whereas those in the second group are entitled only to contributive
benefits.
15Modeling the interaction of workers and employers clearly demands a paper of its
own.
16We exclude individuals who are entitled to disability benefits and those with missing
information that prevent us from computing their accrued pension rights. Furthermore,
we consider only individuals with stable labor market careers (meaning those employed
for at least 80% of their working lives, with fewer than 10 unemployment spells during
such time).
17There is a significant change in the sample composition around the age of 58 (see
Fig. 12 and the discussion in Appendix B). This finding suggests that sample selection
may contribute to some extent to the changes in behavior observed before and after that
age. However, our theoretical results clearly confirm that a substantial part of the
behavior change is a response to the change in incentives around that age.
18A simple measure of modeling costs is the number of state variables needed for each
additional feature included in the model. Here, we managed to handle a model with 4
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state variables (i) by ignoring savings and wealth accumulation, (ii) by confining
ourselves to a stationary situation (without business cycle or time variation in public
regulations), and (iii) by limiting the sample to healthy workers. The rationale for (i)
pertains to the very low levels of liquid wealth observed among workers in the age range
considered in the paper. The rationale for (ii) lies in the complacency surrounding those
expansionary years that led to widespread forecasting errors. The fact is that including
any of those additional factors will come with a hefty price in terms of
programing/computing effort and additional data requirements.
19Arguably, workers endowed with significant liquid wealth could more easily finance
a voluntary unemployment spell. Similarly, the sharp deterioration of market conditions
during the Great Recession makes the voluntary unemployment choice more enticing.
20Note that our database of administrative records fails to provide information on
savings and accumulated assets. We therefore model utility as a function of income
(rather than consumption). Empirically, consumption tracks income closely at older ages
on average (arguably because most accumulated assets in Spain are illiquid and
households pass them on to future generations). However, we can acknowledge that this
feature may be very important for some workers and will be considered in future
extensions of this work. Some work on this issue is being conducted by Benitez-Silva et
al. (2012).
21For the employed, this approximation is exact under the assumption of constant
wages.
22As noted in our discussion in section 2.1, the unemployment authorities pay the
pension contributions on behalf of the worker. Nevertheless, wˆ will decrease whenever π
is less than wˆ (for unemployment records of under 2 years) or if wˆ > 1.25minC for
longer spells.
23Admittedly, there may be some workers who benefit from being made redundant at
particular ages. We leave this possibility for future work (as it can only materializes if
there is coincidence with the interests of the employer).
24In total, we look for six parameters by matching 20 sample moments.
25The sample distribution by age, type (with/without unemployment subsidy) and
duration in unemployment is presented in Fig. 12 in Appendix B.
26The grids are designed to guarantee the presence of a sufficient number of sample
observations in each cell on the grid. The resulting grid is the Cartesian product of the
following sets (all nominal values are in thousands of 2002 euros):
={8.0 12.4 16.4 20.6 25.1 29.5 33.1 36.7} Wˆ ={7.1 10.3 13.1 16.1 19.0 21.8 24.8 28.0}
27η is difficult to pin down because it controls both the degree of risk aversion and the
(inverse of the) willingness to substitute income intertemporally. Standard
macroeconomic models use relatively low values, in the range between 1 and 4. See, for
example, page 50 in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) or, for econometric estimations, page
31 in Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008). The measure and structure of the discount
factor is an active area of research, but most econometric estimates in life-cycle contexts
tend to produce values close to 1. An example can be found on page 815 of Rust and
Phelan (1997).
28We solved several more complex versions of the benchmark model. In particular, we
explored models where workers with larger previous wages got higher wage offers (on
average). This model matched the observed reentry wages by pension rights better that
our benchmark model. The overall fit of the model, however, was not better as the
performance in other dimensions deteriorated.
29There may still be some incentive to remain inactive for workers with high previous
wages and low pension rights. For those workers, the dynamics of wˆmay result in
pension increases, even with constant early retirement penalties.
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30Consider an individual in state x. Denote by Ub(x) the maximum life-cycle utility
achieved by the individual in the benchmark economy and by Uref (x) the maximum
value obtained under the reformed economy. To compute the equivalent variation EV(x),
we first obtain a pure annuity payment, yi(x), that results in the same total life-cycle
utility in the two environments considered:
∑T
a=τ u(yi(x)) = Ui(x) i = {b, ref }.
We keep all the individual decisions (both in the present and in the future) unchanged in
this calculation. The EV(x) is simply yref = yb + EV (x), ie, the annuity payment that,
when added to the benchmark annuity, matches the reformed annuity. We interpret this
value as the amount of money the individual in state x will be willing to pay to avoid the
implementation of the reform (ie, to remain in the benchmark). To evaluate the overall
convenience of the reform, we compare the EV with the changes induced by the reform
in the net pension cost, expressed as an annuity. Our definition of the welfare measure
guarantees that both concepts are defined in a homogeneous way.
31USa = USa(π , wˆ, h), b = b(π , h), VUa+1 = VUa+1(π , wˆ′, h+ 1), wa+1 = wa+1(π , wˆ′, h+ 1),
EWa+1 = EWa+1(w, wˆ′), wmax stands for the maximum possible wage offer and F¯(x) = 1 −
F(x).
32The separation into exogenous vs. endogenous factors is only an approximation as,
for example, individual reservation wages also depend on labor market conditions.
It serves the purpose of emphasizing that individual specific factors can push workers
towards non-participation, irrespectively of labor market conditions.
33 The results are robust to the use of other nonlinear interpolation schemes such as
cubic spline interpolation.
Appendix
A Optimal behavior: theory and simulated patterns
This section extends the discussion of the behavior predicted by the model. First,
section A.1 reviews the theoretical foundations underpinning the choices produced by
our model. Section A.2 completes the analysis by exploring some additional predictions
of the calibrated model in our simulation sample.
A.1 Optimal behavior by the unemployed
Before the ERA, unemployed persons’ choices were limited to two actions: whether to
search or to “non-participate” and, if the worker did search in the previous period and
receive a job offer, whether to accept or reject the offer. Here we review the theoretical
basis of both choices, starting with the latter.
The decision to accept a job offer For workers approaching retirement, deciding
on a job offer is more complex than for younger workers (a choice studied in depth
elsewhere in the literature). The key factors for the young unemployed are the unem-
ployment benefit and the option value of waiting for better offers in the future. For
senior workers, pension benefits (B) play a progressively more important role, while
the relevance of the option value diminishes with age. In all cases, reservation wages
summarize the optimal choice. Fig. 8 illustrates the reservation wages predicted by our
model for certain selected workers. In general, they depend (see eq. (10)) on compar-
ing the values of employment at each wage (EW , formalized in eq. (11)) versus the value
derived from remaining unemployed (VU , formalized in eq. (5)). The latter, in turn, is a
function of:
1. Income sources available outside employment, which are essentially determined by
institutional factors: (i) the average size of the insurance benefit b ; (ii) its
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Fig. 8 Theoretical reservation wages by age and duration in unemployment (top panels) and by age and the
size of accrued pension rights, in thousands of 2002 euros (bottom panels)
dependence on the duration of the spell, h ; (iii) its conversion into a welfare
subsidy after the exhaustion of the contributory benefit; (iv) the rule applied to
update pension rights while unemployed and (v) whether the legal obligation to
search is effectively enforced.
Once the ERA approaches, the details of the pension norms (early retirement
penalties, μ, and the size of minimum pensions, bmin) becomes a progressively
more determining factor.
2. The option value depends on external factors (the conditions of the labor market)
and worker-specific factors: general employability (reflected in search costs,
captured by the value of leisure while searching, ls) and the individual’s risk
aversion (i.e., the ability to endure the uncertainty associated with searching).
The value of employment crucially depends on the expected duration of the employ-
ment spell. Duration is a function of the firing probability δ and, more importantly, of
age (a link stressed in Hairault et al. (2010)). The large differences observed in reserva-
tion wages, w, before and after the ERA (Fig. 8) clearly point towards age as the more
important of the two factors:
1. At early ages (eg. 55), reservation wages are higher among workers entitled to UI
subsidies on top of regular benefits (left-hand column in Fig. 8), those with shorter
unemployment durations (h=1) and, to a lesser extent, those with higher previous
wages π .
In general, accrued pension rights are relatively unimportant at those ages.
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2. As workers grow older, the reservation wage increases appreciably. The predicted
wage losses after re-entry fall sharply, even becoming negative at the normal
retirement age of 65. More importantly, accrued pension rights wˆ become the key
determinant of reservation wages (bottom panels in Fig. 8).
The decision to search for a job We approach the search decision in two steps, consid-
ering the very different situations faced by workers before and after the ERA. Under the
age of 60, retirement pensions are not yet available and the only alternative to searching is
to remain inactive without searching. Current income will be the same in both cases, but
a job seeker must pay search costs upfront (in the model, as a lower value of leisure). The
compensation for that is intertemporal in nature: the worker faces a lottery (an option
with a positive expected payoff but which can be rendered worthless at some future stage).
The value of this option depends on both endogenous (i.e., individual specific) and exoge-
nous factors. This can be easily appreciated by combining eqs. (8) to (10) to obtain an
analytical expression for the search value:
USa = u(b, lS) + βa
[






where we simplify the notation in the text.31 By recalling the value of non-participation,
UN , expressed formally in eq. (7), we can characterize when this is the best possible
choice:
UNa −USa > 0 ⇔ u(b, l¯)−u(b, lS) > βa+1 λ
[





• The exogenous factors favoring non-participation are related to a non-rewarding
labor market with (1) low chances of being offered a job, λ; (2) a distribution of future
wage offers F heavily biased towards small wages and (3) high firing rates (which
reduce the value of EW ).
• The endogenous factors favoring non-search are (1) the utility cost of searching
(lS < l¯), (2) impatience, β , and (3) the value the individual derives from starting the
next period as unemployed. The latter acts both directly and through its impact on
reservation wages (eq (10)).32
All in all, the analysis indicates that non-participation can be the best choice for workers
whose skills are in low demand in themarket, for those that will incur high searching costs
and for those with high current unemployment income and high future pension income.
After the ERA, the retirement option has a very strong bearing on optimal decisions.
As the formal analysis is somewhat more complex in that case, we postpone it until we
have explored the retirement option against a simpler choice: non-participation.
Non-participation and retirement after the Early Retirement Age To understand the
key trade-offs involved in retirement decisions, it is essential to bear inmind that pensions
are calculated by multiplying an early retirement penalty and an average of previous gross
salaries (B = μ(a) wˆ, see eq. (1) and (3)). The value of retirement is simply the present
discounted value of the utility derived from pensions (eq. (6)). After the ERA, this value
should be compared to the value of non-participation, eq. (7), to determine the optimality
of an immediate withdrawal from the labor force (as well as to the value of searching,
as indicated below, to cover all possible choices). It is easier to start by considering the
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Fig. 9 Optimal labor decisions of the unemployed by age. The structure of the tables and the notation
employed is explained in section A.2
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situation of a worker who is certain to retire no later than in the next period, a + 1, (say
at the NRA) and is considering their optimal behavior in this period, a. Searching is not
an option under those circumstances, and the current choice is only between retirement
and non-participation. By adapting eqs. (6) and (7) to this situation, it is easy to formalize
the conditions that make retirement optimal URa (wˆ) − UNa (wˆ) > 0 ⇔
u(B(wˆ), l¯) − u(b, l¯) > βa+1[URa+1(wˆ′) − URa+1(wˆ)]=
βa+1
∑T
i=a+1 β i−a Sa(i)
[
u(B(wˆ′, a + 1), l¯ ) − u(B(wˆ, a), l¯ )
]
For most workers, B(wˆ) is higher than b, implying an immediate gain from claiming the
pension (i.e., a positive left-hand side above). Waiting one extra year, however, tends to
increase pensions, as the gain from smaller early retirement penalties typically exceeds
the loss from the updating in wˆ. This makes B(wˆ′, a + 1) typically higher than B(wˆ, a),
resulting in a positive right-hand side. Consequently, only very impatient workers (or risk-
averse workers, with a strong aversion to intertemporal substitution) will sacrifice future
gains in exchange for current profits.
Relaxing the assumption of definite retirement in the next period a + 1 or consid-
ering the possibility of searching now or in the future, introduces new elements into
the calculation, but the essential intertemporal trade-off is unchanged. These new ele-
ments have already been discussed (when comparing the choice between search and
non-participation before the ERA above) and can easily be adapted to the choices when
immediate retirement is possible. For example, for the unemployed with good chances
of finding an acceptable job, the relevant comparison is between the current gains from
retirement (in terms of income and leisure) versus the possibility of higher income in the
future (both while working in a new job and as a result of subsequently higher future
pensions).
A.2 Themodel’s in-sample predictions
Theory alone (at the qualitative level discussed in the previous section) is insufficient to
explain observed behavior. Accordingly, we need full quantitative predictions from the
model, and this can be achieved only after the model’s calibration (assignment of spe-
cific parameter values) and numerical solution (as dynamic stochastic models have no
closed-form solutions). Section 3.2 is dedicated to the former procedure. Here we briefly
elaborate on the latter and complete the information in the main text on the model’s
quantitative predictions.
The numerical procedure followed to solve the individual problem is fairly straight-
forward. Numerical value functions are computed by backward induction starting at a
maximum working-age N¯ (68). At every previous age considered, each value function is
solved exactly on a finite grid (whose values are presented in endnote 26). Linear inter-
polation is used whenever a value function has to be evaluated outside the computational
grid.33 The optimal decision rules of the unemployed take the form presented in Fig. 9.
Each array in these tables reproduces the optimal behavior for a particular age and unem-
ployment duration (h). Each cell in an array is defined by a combination of a previous
wage, π , and a level of accrued pension rights, wˆ, belonging to the discretized sets×Wˆ .
The decision shown in the cell defined by the i-row and j-column, di,j, is the optimal
behavior for the individual whose previous wage is the i-th element of  and whose pen-
sion rights are given by the j-th element of Wˆ . For the unemployed, di,j takes the value “1”
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when search is the optimal choice; “0” if it is optimal to retire; and “N” if non-participation
is best.
Finally, we complete the information in the text (the average predicted behavior by age
in Figs. 3 and 4) by displaying the behavior when we simultaneously control for the dura-
tion of the unemployment spell h (Fig. 10) and for the size of accrued pension rights
(Fig. 11).
B Empirical evidence: sample composition at different ages
In the simulation experiment, we explore the optimal labor flows predicted by our
model in a particular empirical sample. As a result, our aggregate predictions are heavily
influenced by the sample distribution of individual characteristics (age, unemployment
duration, accrued pension rights and previous wages). The changing patterns of these
distributions by age (for a given time interval) also reveal certain underlying behavioral
regularities. Figure 12 shows some of the properties of this set of distributions, empha-
sizing the change in tendencies experienced at the age of 58 (i.e., just two years before
the ERA). A majority of the workers made redundant at this age can wait till the ERA
while enjoying the (generous) contributive unemployment benefit, making them espe-
cially susceptible to (informal) early retirement. The graphs show significant changes in
the sample composition at that particular age. Before that age, the sample is mostly com-
posed of the long-term unemployed with a relatively low income (making them suitable
for unemployment subsidies). By contrast, workers made redundant at the age of 58 have
a higher income (both current and career income, as reflected by their accrued pension
rights), whereby they are not entitled to unemployment subsidies. The firing intensity is
also appreciably higher at 58 and 59, reducing the proportion of long-term unemployed
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Fig. 10 DATA (blue continuous line) vs. theoretical predictions (green, dashed line) conditional on the
duration of the unemployment spell (short, h < 3, vs long h = 3)




















































Fig. 11 DATA (blue continuous line) vs. theoretical predictions (green, dashed line) conditional on the size of
accrued pension rights (from Low PR in the left column to high PR in the right column)
in the sample. It should also be noted that the average reservation wage of certain types
of workers increases significantly at the age of 58 (Fig. 13). This is partly the result of
changes in behavior specific to that age, although it owes a lot to the change in the sample
composition. Studying the possible endogeneity of the redundancy flows at those ages is
left for future work.
C Pension cost calculation
We evaluate the total cost each individual represents for the social security system by
computing their Net Pension Cost (NPC). It is defined as the expected present discounted
value of the flows of transfers received by the individual net of the contributions to be
paid to the system. The value is conditional upon the observable state of the individual
(age, duration in unemployment, pension rights and previous wages) and is computed
recursively.
All flows are discounted to a common age (60) using the same discount factor (d,
3 % in our case). In order to draw a comparison with the welfare measure imple-
mented in the paper, the total pension costs are converted into the equivalent constant
annual flow (annuity pension cost). The analytical expressions for the total costs are
as follows:
• The first value is computed at the maximum retirement age N. The cost implied by
an individual observed at that age making the transition from unemployment to
retirement is:
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Fig. 12 Distribution of the empirical sample at each age: proportion of the unemployed entitled to subsidy
(top left), long-term unemployed (top right) and unemployed with high pension rights, PR (bottom left). The
bottom right-hand panel shows the proportion of new unemployed (less than one year duration) without







St(i)B(wˆ,N) = B(wˆ, t)ATN , 60 (12)
Aji, 60 stands for the expected present discounted value of one unit of income received
in every period of the age range {i, . . . , j} and discounted to age 60.
• For individuals observed at the age N-1, the cost associated with retirement,
PCRN−1(wˆ) responds to an expression that is the same as (12). For individuals who
remain employed at that age, the implicit cost reflects the contributions paid
throughout the year and the change in accrued pension rights:
PCEN−1(w, wˆ) = −cot(w)AN−1N−1, 60 + SN−1(N)PCRN (wˆ′)
Fig. 13 Average reservation wages by age in the simulation sample
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Pension rights are updated as in (3). Finally, the implicit liability for the unemployed is:
PCUN−1(π , wˆ, h) = b(π , h)AN−1N−1, 60 + SN−1(N)PCRN (wˆ′)
• At earlier ages t < N − 1, the expressions for the employed and the unemployed
become rather cumbersome, reflecting the individuals’ different possible behavioral
reactions.
– For the employed of age t, the implicit cost PCEt (w, wˆ) is:
−cot(w)Att+
+δ St(t + 1)
[
IUt+1(R|w, wˆ′, 1)PCRt+1(wˆ′) + IUt+1(U|w, wˆ′, 1)PCUt+1(w, wˆ′, 1)
]
+(1 − δ) St(t + 1)
[
IEt+1(R|w, wˆ′)PCRt+1(wˆ′) + IEt+1(E|w, wˆ′)PCEt+1(w, wˆ′)
]
δ is the exogenous dismissal probability. If the individual is fired at the end of
t, the individual is unemployed at the beginning of age t with state
x ≡ (π , wˆ, h) = (w, wˆ′, 1)). IUt+1(R|w, wˆ′, 1) and IUt+1(U|w, wˆ′, 1) are indicator
functions taking the value one if the optimal decision is either to retire or
remain unemployed. The interpretation of IEt+1(j|w, wˆ′) j = E,R is exactly the
same.
– For the unemployed of age t and state x = (π , wˆ, h):
PCUt (x) = b(π , h)Att+ U benefit in t
+St(t + 1) It+1(S|x)PEt (x)Ew[PCEt+1(w, wˆ′)]+ Successful search
+St(t + 1) It+1(S|x) (1 − PEt (x))CUt+1(x′)+ Unsuccessful search
+St(t + 1) It+1(NS|x)CUt+1(x′) Inactivity
It(S|x) and It(NS|x) indicate the optimality of searching or remaining inactive
at age t and state x, respectively; PEt (x) = λ(t, h) (1 − (w¯(x))) is the
probability of a successful search and Ew[PCEt+1(w, w¯′)]=
∫∞
wˆ PCEt+1
(w, wˆ′) dFw is the expected value of a successful search. It should be noted,
finally, that the value of starting the next period as unemployed is (reflecting
the retirement option):
CUt+1(x′) = It+1(R|π , wˆ′, h+1)PCRt+1(wˆ′)+It+1(U|π , wˆ′, h+1)PCUt+1(π , wˆ′, h+1)
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